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1. Introduction
Public decisions often involve trade-offs where economic costs and
benefits are spread over time. The choice of discount rate to map pol-
icy effects into net present value is then crucial. Arguably, at least
for long-term projects, the choice should be governed by principles of
intergenerational equity, and yet, there is no robust method to derive
the social discount rate from such principles.
Traditional cost-benefit analysis requires using the interest rate for
present value calculations.1 On the other hand, recent literature (e.g.,
Stern 2006, Arrow 2007, already Arrow and Kurz 1970) obtains the
discount rate for final consumption from a classical welfarist function.
This method requires evaluating the full impact of the policy on indi-
vidual consumption, while offering a way to relate intergenerational eq-
uity (through the formulation of a welfare function) to the discount rate
(cf. sect. 1.3). Traditional cost-benefit analysis lacks this advantage, but
is easy to use, as no equilibrium calculation is needed (cf. sect. 1.2).
The approach here includes those positive features of both approaches.
1.1. Intergenerational Equity. Even the U.S. Office of Management
and Budget1 (2003) (omb) refers explicitly to the requirement of eq-
uity vis-à-vis future generations, and acknowledges it by suggesting,
for projects with substantial long-term impact, a further analysis at a
rate “between 1 and 3%” (p. 36), with no further precision.2
The issue of discounting utility and, more broadly, intergenerational
justice, has been controversial in the literature3 since, probably, Sidg-
wick (1874, p. 414).4 Ramsey (1928) (p. 543) presents discounting fu-
ture utility (“enjoyments”) as a “practice which is ethically indefensible
and arises merely from the weakness of the imagination.” He suggests
1Circular A-4 of the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (2003) mandates
that all executive agencies and establishments conduct a “regulatory analysis” for
any new proposal, and more specifically (pp. 33–36), a cost-benefit analysis, at the
rates of both 3% and 7%. Both rates are rationalised there as ‘the’ interest rate:
the first one relative to private savings, the second one relative to capital formation
and/or displacement, i.e., as the gross return on capital.
2Other practitioners share this view, e.g.: “Morally speaking, there is no differ-
ence between current and future risk. Theories which, for example, attempt to dis-
count effects on human health in twenty years to the extent that they are equivalent
to only one-tenth of present-day effects in cost-benefit considerations are not accept-
able.”(Wildi, Appel, Buser, Dermange, Eckhardt, Hufschmied, and Keusen, 2000).
3And it is not our purpose here to argue in favour or against. There may very
well be good arguments e.g. for rather using the population growth rate to discount.
4“How far we are to consider the interests of posterity when they seem to conflict
with those of existing human beings? It seems, however, clear that the time at which
a man exists cannot affect the value of his happiness from a universal point of view;
and that the interests of posterity must concern a Utilitarian as much as those of his
contemporaries, except in so far as the effect of his actions on posterity—and even
the existence of human beings to be affected—must necessarily be more uncertain.”
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then a way to overcome technical difficulties of constructing a discount-
free utilitarian social welfare criterion using the differences between ac-
tual and “bliss” utility levels. Utility discounting is not required per se
in our case either, as we evaluate temporary policy changes, and thus
aggregate utility differences from a status-quo.5
To discuss intergenerational equity, one needs a welfare function.
1.2. Equilibrium interpretation of Cost-Benefit Analysis. One
way to understand cost-benefit analysis in welfare terms is as follows.6
The status-quo is a given competitive equilibrium. Construct a social
welfare function (swf), W, as a weighted sum,
∑
nλnun, of individual
utilities, with weights chosen such as to equate individual marginal
utilities of consumption (for the goods consumed in strictly positive
quantities) with the equilibrium price system p: λn∇un = p.
7,8
Viewing projects as small perturbations of individual endowments,
δωn,
9 consider the induced variation of social welfare:
δW =
∑
n
λnδun =
∑
n
λn〈∇un, δcn〉 = 〈p,
∑
n
δcn〉 = 〈p,
∑
n
δωn〉
5Aggregation of utility differences is also why Ramsey’s egalitarianism and strong
Pareto can be combined here, avoiding the impossibility results of e.g. Basu and
Mitra (2003); Crespo, Núñez, and Rincón-Zapatero (2008). The literature in wel-
fare economics and social choice offers diverse ways to construct welfare criteria by
weakening one of the two desiderata. Koopmans (1960) axiomatises discounting
utilities, or “social impatience”. Several authors are concerned with incorporating
intergenerational justice principles in a social welfare criterion. Chichilnisky (1996)
offers the “no dictatorship of the past” and “no dictatorship of the future” axioms
(describing “sustainable preferences”) and shows that the resulting welfare crite-
rion is inconsistent with a sum of discounted utilities. d’Aspremont (2006) and
Asheim, Mitra, and Tungodden (2006) show existence of welfare functions satisfy-
ing some of Koopmans’ (1960) postulates and principles of intergenerational equity,
in particular, Chichilnisky’s (1996) axioms. For alternative formulations of ethically
acceptable allocations see, e.g., Asheim (1991); Fleurbaey and Michel (2003).
6Whenever direct transfers are infeasible, ignoring distributional effects might
be problematic, if not misleading. The importance of using explicit criteria for
cost-benefit analysis was stressed by Drèze and Stern (1987), distinguishing this
approach from that examining potential improvements. Formulating a social wel-
fare function, the authors argue, provides greater transparency to the cost-benefit
analysis, assures consistency of related choices and avoids a special preference for
inaction. See Mishan (1976) for an in-depth discussion of potential Pareto improve-
ments (traced back to Pigou (1932)) and their application to cost-benefit analysis.
For a more recent overview of cost-benefit criteria see Coate (2000).
7It is implied, for example, by Samuelson’s (1954) optimality condition (3).
8Equivalently, assuming, e.g., concave utility functions, one obtains from the
first welfare theorem utility weights such that the given equilibrium maximises the
corresponding weighted sum of utilities over all feasible allocations; those are the λn.
9Since we omit for simplicity public goods and externalities from our formal
model, the δωn are assumed to include, in addition to the direct effect of the
project, also the compensating variation (in goods) for the different external effects.
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since the inner product 〈p, δy〉 = 0, with y the equilibrium production.
So, the value of a project in welfare terms is just the value under the cur-
rent price system of the corresponding change in aggregate endowment.
In a dynamic interpretation, where goods are dated, the equilibrium
price system includes, in particular, the interest rate, as the price of
future goods in terms of today’s. This is thus the discount rate to use.
Consistency of policy choices is one way to rationalise those welfare
weights: they implicitly reflect the objective of the political authority
setting income tax rates and transfer policies, and the administration or
consultant doing the cost-benefit analysis has no business questioning
this. This argument does not apply however for a study to inform
the political authority itself of the appropriateness of various choices:
there, explicitness about the welfare foundations is crucial.
Since no other specification of the welfare weights can be used, no
room is left for a normative analysis of intergenerational equity.
Another problem is that conceptually this approach hinges to some
extent on Pareto efficiency of the given competitive equilibrium, while
long-term projects involving several generations must be analysed in an
overlapping generations setting, where the first welfare theorem fails.
1.3. Welfarist deduction of the discount rate. Alternatively, one
can follow Arrow and Kurz (1970), as, e.g., in the analysis of Stern
(2006), and in Dasgupta (2008):
For simplicity, take a discrete-time model where individuals live for
just one period, with utility function U(ct) =
c1−ρt
1−ρ
where ρ > 0. The
economy is on a balanced growth path with per-capita consumption
growing exponentially at rate γ > 0, production being black-boxed
for now. The status-quo per-capita consumption at time t is c0e
γt,
with c0 > 0. Consider a policy that involves a variation in aggregate
consumption δCt for each generation t. It is to be evaluated at time
0, using the classical criterion, W =
∑
t
∑
n∈Nt
e−βtU(cnt ), where Nt is
the set of individuals at time t. Then the net (social) benefit equals
δW =
∑
t
∑
n∈Nt
e−βtU ′
(
c0e
γt
)
δcnt =
∑
t
c−ρ0 e
−(ργ+β)tδCt
In this case, discounting is consistent with a welfare evaluation, and
the resulting social discount rate is ργ + β, while there is no interest
rate, since agents live for one period. We postpone the discussion of the
estimates for this social discount rate till sect. 6, once it is established.
Observe indeed this example does not prove anything; in particular,
since individuals live only one period they have no incentive to save,
so there can be no capital accumulation and growth. When there is
growth and savings, there is also an interest rate, which individuals
would use to smooth the shock over their lifetime, each according to his
own time-preferences, so one might expect the result to be driven back
to the interest rate. Thus to establish such a result, we need at least
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a growth model (to see the parameter γ coming out), with generations
to be able to talk of intergenerational equity, and those should overlap
lest there be no capital accumulation and hence no growth—shortly, an
og model. Finally a non-zero population growth must be used, so γ is
unambiguously distinguished from the (e.g., golden rule) interest rate.
Thus a major difficulty with this approach is that to evaluate a policy,
it has to be translated into changes in personal consumption, which are
then discounted; further, just computing the change in aggregate con-
sumption (as in the above example) is not sufficient as soon as individu-
als differ, whether in their preferences or in their endowment. Hence the
method requires a full equilibrium computation, taking into account all
after-effects of the policy shock as well the anticipatory effects before.
Finally, this theory provides no guidance for obtaining an intergener-
ationally fair discount rate: it merely substitutes for a unknown num-
ber, the discount rate, an even less known function U : indeed, in such
a welfarist approach, only the indifference map is retained as an indi-
vidual characteristic, contrary to utilitarian tradition, and the choice
of utility representation is thought of as a parameter of the welfare
function (here, ρ). While we have a rather precise idea of what should
be the order of magnitude of the discount rate — e.g., the omb’s “be-
tween 1 and 3%” (cf. supra) —, this theory, β + ργ, yields nothing,
since both β and ρ are free parameters. Even if one tries to estimate
them separately, requiring intergenerational equity to mean β = 0, and
estimating ρ as a coefficient of relative risk aversion (to retain some
utilitarian flavour, or to get correct utilities for lotteries), reasonable es-
timates of β+ργ still vary widely (cf. discussion in sect. 6). This is also
illustrated e.g. by the recent controversies about Stern’s report (Stern,
2007; Arrow, 2007), and is typically settled by arbitrarily fixing one of
those parameters (ρ or β) such as to get a reasonable discount rate.
1.4. The solution. We evaluate the welfare effect of a temporary pol-
icy change in an og growth model, without equilibrium computation.
A utility function over policies is an iwf (invariant welfare function)
when a time-shift of policies multiplies welfare by a constant (and adds
a constant). Thm. 1 shows that the derivative of an iwf w.r.t. time-
dependent policy changes is the discounted sum of a static (independent
of time) evaluation of the instantaneous change.
To apply this main result we consider a growth model (og), as re-
quired (cf. supra), in a general equilibrium fashion, adding the minimal
assumptions needed for existence of balanced growth equilibria, and
prove that the composite map — from policies to individual allocations,
then to individual utilities, themselves aggregated into welfare — is an
iwf. This result stems explicitly from the properties of the individual
maps involved in the composition, a.o. that the first map is an outcome
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function (def. 8), for example the selection of a locally unique equilib-
rium in the neighbourhood of a balanced growth equilibrium (bge).10
The composite map is an iwf, so, without any equilibrium computa-
tion, the change in welfare resulting from policy perturbations has the
discounted sum form, with an explicit social discount rate.
In sum, our main result rationalises the commonly-practiced net
present value calculation for a broad set of economies and policies.
In particular, we allow heterogeneous preferences, only requiring ho-
mogeneity of individual life-time utility with respect to consumption,
which is needed for balanced growth. The degree of homogeneity can
vary in the population and time-separability is not necessary. Durable
and storable goods are also included in the model (sect. 3.1.2), enabling
agents to smooth shocks over time, when those are represented as en-
dowment perturbations. Finally, to describe naturally the anticipation
of policy variations, time starts at −∞ rather than 0.11
1.5. Results for the social discount rate. The two welfare func-
tions we consider yield different social discount rates as applied to mon-
etised policies in the og model.
Classical utilitarian welfare with homogeneous preferences. Discount-
ing is still valid, and with rate ργ + β, exactly as in the example in
sect. 1.3, though we deal with a very different concept: the endowment
equivalent of policies is being discounted, not the final consumption.
Classical utilitarian welfare with heterogeneous preferences. If pref-
erences with respect to life-time consumption differ across agents, the
derivative of the classical utilitarian welfare function with respect to
policies does not exhibit the discounted sum form anymore, so any
reference to a constant social discount rate is meaningless in this case.
Relative utilitarian welfare. This is the sum of individual von Neu-
mann-Morgenstern (vnm) utilities, 0–1 normalised on the feasible set
(assumed time-invariant too).12 Now the social discount rate is well
defined even for heterogeneous preferences, and equals the growth rate
of per-capita gdp, γ, say, 2% per year.13
1.6. Roadmap. Sect. 2 presents the basic tool for evaluating policy
reforms. In sect. 2.2, the outcome map (iwf) is fully abstracted, as
a map from policies to welfare (like in decision theory); so this would
10Determinacy (cf. sect. 7) is a must for any form of comparative statics.
11This poses novel questions concerning the above model, especially how to spec-
ify correctly initial conditions at −∞. This is addressed in sect. 3.1, because those
initial conditions are crucial to our argument (in prop. 1); informally, there can be
no balanced growth in presence of natural resources.
12See Dhillon and Mertens (1999) for axiomatisation.
13For the U.S., e.g., according to Johnston and Williamson (2007), average till
2006 is 2.1% since 1950, 1.9% since 1900 or 1850, 2% since 1869, the first year where
data become reliable (loc. cit.), especially for growth computations since by then
both colonial expansion and the immediate aftermath of the Civil War are over.
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also cover models with a single decision-maker, or an infinitely-lived
agent. In sect. 2.3, this is applied to a model with a bit more structure,
more appropriate for an economy with finitely-lived agents: the map
associates to each policy a full profile of individual utilities (as in social
choice theory), and the aggregation is done explicitly, enabling use of
the previous result. For further usage, the results are particularised to
the classical aggregation in sect. 2.4 (thm. 2).
Sect. 3.1 describes the overlapping generations economy with exoge-
nous growth, and sect. 3.2 defines then outcome maps for this model
as having still more structure, being now maps from policies to alloca-
tions. The time-invariance requirement on them is carefully justified
by exhibiting an automorphism of the economy (uniquely) associated
with time-shifts. The result of sect. 2 is then applied to this economy in
sect. 4, to derive the discount rates implied by the classical (sect. 4.1)
and relative utilitarian (sect. 4.2) criteria, with quite different implica-
tions. In each case, we first compute the derivative of welfare w.r.t.
policy variations on an abstract policy space, and then apply this to
a specific policy space of lump sum taxes and subsidies, thought of
as representing the monetised value of public projects, to derive the
discount rate for cost-benefit analysis.
An alternative derivation of γ as the discount rate, based on the value
of a human life is presented in sect. 5. Merits of the two criteria are
then discussed in section 6. Concluding remarks in sect. 7 address the
issues of evaluating the static component of the derivative of welfare
and of non-vacuity of the results.
In the formal treatment below, longer proofs are deferred to App. B.
2. Differentiating welfare w.r.t. policy variations
Notation. R is the extended real line, i.e., R ∪ {+∞} ∪ {−∞}; E⋆
denotes the dual of a topological vector space E.
2.1. The basic model.
2.1.1. Policies. Basic policies are time-independent specifications of
government actions. They belong to a Banach space, since already
income tax schedules are in a function space. The status-quo is some
basic policy kept constant over time. A policy (reform) is a temporary
deviation from the status-quo.
Continuous time is probably only a matter of convenience here, or of
greater transparency of the model; but note it starts at−∞ rather than
at 0, which is the only way to model fully anticipated policy changes.
Definition 1. (i) Let th : t 7→ t+ h be the translation by h on R;
and Sh : ξ 7→ ξ ◦ t−h be the time-shift on functions of time.
(ii) (B, π¯) is the set B of basic policies, open in a Banach space E,
together with some point π¯ ∈ B, called the status-quo policy.
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(iii) KE is the space of infinitely differentiable functions ϕ : R → E
with compact support. A sequence ϕn ∈ KE converges to 0 if it
and its successive derivatives converge uniformly to 0 and ∃h ∈
R : |x| ≥ h ⇒ ϕn (x) = 0 for all n. K
⋆
E is the space of linear
functionals ψ on KE s.t. ψ (ϕn)→ 0 when ϕn → 0 in KE .
14
(iv) F is a topological vector space of E-valued functions s.t. ShF ⊆
F and s.t. KE embeds continuously as a dense subset of F .
15
(v) P is the set of policies π : t 7→ π(t) ∈ B s.t. δπ = π − π¯ ∈ F .
Remark 1. KE = {ϕ : R → E | ∀f ∈ E
∗, f ◦ ϕ ∈ KR}.
The policy space P is shift-invariant, as is F ; i.e., policies can be
shifted in time. Def. 2 below implies this shift must be meaningful; so
we have to think about a basic policy as expressed in time-invariant
terms. This implies, in particular, that a basic policy has to be unit-free
and non-discriminatory, not prescribing date-specific actions or special
treatment of particular individuals or generations, to be applicable at
any time. For example, the income-tax part of a policy would satisfy
this if brackets of the rate-schedule are indexed to per-capita income.
More precisely, in an og model, a basic policy, if kept constant over
time, should lead to balanced growth (lemma 7).
2.1.2. Objective function.
Definition 2. W : P → R is an invariant welfare function (iwf) if ∃
Lebesgue-measurable ah, bh > 0: ∀h ∈ R,W ◦ Sh = ah + bhW .
16
Lemma 1. For an iwf W there exist constants ζ and A ∈ R s.t. ah
and bh in def. 2 can be taken as ah = A
eζh−1
eζ−1
, bh = e
ζh, the ratio being
defined by continuity at ζ = 0. Such a ζ is unique if W takes at least
2 different real values. ζ is called the parameter of the iwf.
Proof. By lemma 8 in App.A, identifying values of W with constant
R-valued functions of time. 
2.2. The main tool. Recall a map is Gateaux-differentiable if it has
directional derivatives in every direction, which form a continuous lin-
ear function of the direction. It is the weakest sense of differentiability.
Theorem 1. Assume (i) ∀f ∈ F ∃ε0 > 0: |ε| < ε0 ⇒ π¯ + εf(t) ∈
B ∀t,17 and (ii) ∀q ∈ E⋆, f 7→
∫
eζt〈q, f(t)〉dt belongs to F ⋆. 18 If W, an
iwf with parameter ζ , is Gateaux-differentiable on P at π¯ (so W (π¯) 6=
±∞), then its differential equals
∫
eζt〈q, δπ(t)〉dt for some q∈E⋆.
14K[= KR] is defined in Schwartz (1957-59) or Gel’fand and Shilov (1959).
15E.g., the space of continuous functions with compact support and the sup norm.
16I.e., the vnm preferences on P are shift-invariant.
17Just to ensure the Gateaux-differential is unambiguously defined.
18Trivially true for F the space of continuous functions with compact support.
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The theorem justifies discounting, i.e., shows that the time-compo-
nent of the derivative of welfare is exponential in time, with a time-
independent shadow-price q applied to current policy changes δπ(t).
iwf’s have by definition full domain, but for their use in thm. 1 it
suffices that the domain intersects every straight line through π¯ in a
neighbourhood of π¯, and this is how they are obtained in fact (cf. 3.2.4).
One can even allow them to be a correspondence, as in thm. 2.
An example of how to prove the differentiability assumption can be
found in Mertens and Rubinchik (2008).
Next we express the discount rate ζ in terms of the parameters of
an og model. The first step is to move from the objective of a single
decision maker to a welfare aggregator over individual utilities.
2.3. Constructing an iwf. This section offers sufficient conditions
for a welfare function to be an iwf in an og model.
2.3.1. Population. Individuals differ by type τ ∈ {1, . . . ,Θ} and by
birth-date, x ∈ R. They have life-length Tτ , and N
τ
xdx = N
τ
0 e
νxdx is
the number of births in (x, x+ dx).
2.3.2. Utilities over policies.
Definition 3. A profile v of real-valued functions vτx, defined on P , is
a valuation, if it is weakly shift-invariant, i.e., ∃ Lebesgue-measurable
ah ∈ R
Θ, bh > 0: ∀h ∈ R, v ◦Sh = ah+ bhSh ◦ v.
19 The profile is a strict
valuation if it is shift-invariant, i.e., if ah = 0, bh = 1.
There is a simple translation of a valuation into a strict one:
Lemma 2. For a valuation v there exist constants A ∈ RΘ and ̺ s.t.
uτx = A
τ 1−e−̺ x
e̺−1
+ e−̺ xvτx is a strict valuation, with x for the ratio at
̺ = 0. Such ̺ and A are unique except if ∀τ, vτx(π) is constant in x and
π. ̺ is called the parameter of the valuation.
Proof. By lemma 8, with n = Θ, bh = e
̺h and ah = A
e̺h−1
e̺−1
for some
constants A and ̺, the ratio being h for ̺ = 0. The rest is obvious. 
Corollary 1. For a valuation v and a constant policy π, vτx(π) is of
the form e̺xvτ (π) + Cτ .
Proof. Apply lemma 2, and for v strict, use the definition. 
Thus the parameter ̺ is the rate of growth of individual utility scales
over policies. It will be further disentangled in prop. 2 and 3 into effects
stemming from growth and effects of the utility functions.
19I.e., shifts preserve interpersonal comparisons of utility differences.
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2.3.3. Aggregation.
Definition 4. A social welfare aggregator (swa) is an R-valued func-
tion V defined on RΘ×R (all utility-profiles), s.t. ∃ Lebesgue-measurable
ah, bh > 0: ∀h ∈ R, V ◦Sh = ah+bhV , i.e., V is weakly shift-invariant.
20
A similar proof as for lemma 1, yields now:
Lemma 3. ah and bh in def. 4 can be taken as ah = a
ech−1
ec−1
, bh = e
ch, the
ratio being defined by continuity at c = 0. Such c is unique if V takes
at least 2 different real values. c is called the parameter of the swa.
Given the goal to evaluate policy changes from the status quo, it is
natural to aggregate individual utility differences from the status quo:
Lemma 4. Take a valuation v with parameter ̺, and a swa Vc,r with
parameter c, positively homogeneous of degree r.
Then W (·)
def
= Vc,r(v(·)− v(π¯)) is an iwf with ζ = ̺r + c.
If the valuation is strict, homogeneity is not needed, and ζ = c.
We could continue and use general swa’s throughout (homogeneous
in sect. 4.1); however, for concreteness, and to have an explicit pa-
rameter c, we concentrate henceforth on the classical case, and first
summarise for future use our results for that case.
2.4. The utilitarian aggregator. The two social welfare functions
(swf) used in sect. 4 are based on the same utilitarian aggregator. It
is however not necessarily a map, so some additional care is required.
Definition 5. The utilitarian aggregator S maps a valuation v to
S(v) =
∫∞
−∞
e−βx
∑
τ N
τ
x (v
τ
x − v
τ
x(π¯))dx, understood as the interval be-
tween the lower and upper Denjoy-integrals (e.g., Gordon, 1994).21
Definition 6. An R-valued correspondence Γ with domain in F is G-
differentiable at x iff every f : F → R, s.t. f(y) ∈ Γ(y) when Γ(y) is de-
fined and non-empty, is s.t. f(x) ∈ R, and Gateaux-differentiable at x.
Their (common) Gateaux-differential is then the G-differential of Γat x.
Lemma 5. For a valuation v with parameter ̺, and S∗ the upper
bound of S (the upper-integral), S∗(v) is an iwf with ζ = ̺+ ν − β.
Proof. S∗(v) = W of lemma 4, using the swa, with degree r = 1 and
parameter c = ν−β, Vc,r : u 7→
∫ ∗
e−βx
∑
τ N
τ
0 e
νxuτxdx. 
20It may sometimes be more convenient to use as domain a specific shift-
invariant subset U of RΘ×R (e.g., continuous functions), restricting valuations to
be U-valued. We will not need this embellishment here.
21The basic reason for using Denjoy integration is the capital-accumulation equa-
tion in sect. 3.1 below, to be sure the meaning of its differential equation form is the
same as that of the integral form, and then to systematically use always the same
integration theory on R. No harm is done by sticking with the most encompassing
one; in particular in this case, where a requirement of absolute summability would
have no economic meaning whatsoever.
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Theorem 2. Let v be a valuation with parameter ̺. If W = S(v) is
G-differentiable on P at π¯ and ∀q ∈ E⋆, f 7→
∫
e(̺+ν−β)t〈q, f(t)〉dt ∈ F ⋆,
then ∃q ∈ E⋆ s.t. W ’s G-differential at π¯ equals
∫
e(̺+ν−β)t〈q, δπ(t)〉dt.
Proof. G-differentiability of W implies assumption (i) of thm. 1 holds,
and the other is assumed. It also implies S∗ is Gateaux-differentiable,
hence its differential from thm. 1 is the G-differential of W . 
We obtain thus β − ν − ̺ as discount rate for policies. Our purpose
in the next two sections is to identify the last parameter, ̺, in terms
of economic primitives in an og model.
3. A growing economy
Valuations with their built-in time-invariance might seem confined
to stationary economies, but they also arise naturally in models with
exogenous growth. We impose only the minimal conditions required for
existence of balanced growth: homogeneity of utility functions with re-
spect to consumption, constant returns to scale in production, absence
of land and natural resources, and labour-saving technological growth.
3.1. The economy.
3.1.1. Consumption and labour. Instantaneous consumption is a non-
negative bundle of n consumption goods and h fractions of total time
allocated to h different types of labour. Individual preferences over
lifetime streams of time allocation and consumption bundles are rep-
resented by a utility function U τ, homogeneous of degree 1 − ρτ in
consumption. There are two interpretations of the parameter ρτ : (1)
relative risk aversion coefficient, (2) income elasticity of the marginal
utility of income. Indeed, by fixing consumption prices and relative
wages, labour income varies linearly with a numeraire wage by the ho-
mogeneity, so an individual indirect utility function can be viewed as
a function of (labour-)income at those fixed consumption prices and
relative wages..
The fraction of time, zτi (s, t), devoted at date t to activity i by an
agent of type τ and age s is multiplied by a non-negative and integrable
efficiency factor ετi (s), to form effective time. Effective time devoted at
date t to any activity is multiplied by eγt to form effective labour input,
eγtετi (s)z
τ
i (s, t), thus representing labour-saving technological progress.
Example. With γ = 0 and ε(s) = 1 in the first part of life and zero
thereafter the model is a continuous-time reinterpretation of the stan-
dard og model, as presented in Gale (1973) or Samuelson (1958).
DISCOUNT RATE FOR COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 13
3.1.2. Production. There are m capital goods, and a corresponding
investment good for each, linked by the usual capital accumulation
equation, Ki ′(t) = I i(t) − δiKi(t),22 with Ki ≥ 0 capital and I i in-
vestment of type i, and δi the depreciation rate. Consumption and in-
vestment goods are manufactured instantaneously by production firms
from (the services of) capital and effective labour (and, possibly, from
investment), with as instantaneous production set a closed convex cone
Y ⊆ Rh−×R
m
− ×R
m×Rn of production vectors (−L,−K, I, C), satisfy-
ing the classical free-disposal and irreversibility (Y contains no straight
line) conditions. An investment firm of type i acquires capital Ki(t0)
at time t0, chooses investment flows, rents out accumulated capital to
production firms, and sells Ki(t1) at time t1 > t0.
Investment goods can be viewed both as outputs and inputs. E.g.,
disvestment is crucial to model resource extraction. Or, to model a
storable good, introduce a corresponding investment good and capital
good (“the good in storage”). A production firm creates the storable
investment good, purchased by an intermediary investment (“storage”)
firm that transforms it into the corresponding capital good, which has
no use in production. At the time of consumption, the investment firm
disinvests and sells the corresponding investment good to a production
(“marketing”) firm, that transforms it one to one into the corresponding
consumption good. So allow all investment firms to disinvest as well as
invest in all goods; restrictions on disinvestment are described by Y .
To include consumer durables, introduce the corresponding invest-
ment and capital goods. A production firm creates the durable invest-
ment good, purchased by an intermediary investment firm, which rents
the capital good out to a leasing production firm, that produces with
this capital the consumption good (services), purchased by consumers.
The rest of this subsection is to ensure that the production set of the
economy (set of feasible input and output paths) is well-defined.
To ensure its boundedness, assume capital can not reproduce itself:
Assumption 1 (No-rabbit economy). (0,−K, I, 0) ∈ Y ⇒ I ≤ 0.
Remark 2. Observe that although production of durables, as described
before, involves a production of consumption good with only capital
and no labour input, it does not violate our assumption on Y that no
investment good can be produced without some form of labour input.
Similarly production activities (as for storable goods) transforming in-
vestment goods one to one into consumption goods, without any capital
or labour input, do not violate this assumption.
To see why such restrictions on the instantaneous production set are
needed consider the following “rabbit economy”.
22Assumed to hold a.e., and implying the conditions for it to be meaningfull:
that Ki
t
is assumed locally a Denjoy primitive and Ii
t
locally Denjoy-integrable.
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Example. Assume a single good, a single type of labour, a ces produc-
tion function (AKα+BLα)1/α, A1/α ≥ R with R = γ+ ν + δ. In order
to get an upper bound on capital and investment consider a path with
all agents working full-time and consuming nothing. Note that Lt =
L0e
(γ+ν)t, so for D = BLα0 , K
′(t) = (AKα(t)+Deα(γ+ν)t)1/α−δK(t); or
with x(t) = K(t)e−(γ+ν)t, x′(t) = (Axα(t)+D)1/α−Rx(t) ≥ D1/α > 0.
Since x(t) ≥ 0, there is no solution, i.e., the upper bound of K(t) is
infinity. And even if B = 0, the solutions are x(t) = Ce(A
1/α−R)t, with
C ≥ 0 arbitrarily large, so K(t) is unbounded in this case too.
As for any differential equation, initial conditions are needed. Their
natural form is that the capital stock Kt converges at −∞ to given
initial values. Note that such initial values of land and resources23 are
thus part of the description of the technology; any feasible path must
converge to the specified values. But, for balanced growth, those initial
values must be zero, thus ruling out land and natural resources:
Assumption 2 (Initial condition). Let δ = mini δ
i. Then eδtKt con-
verges exponentially fast to 0 along some sequence t→ −∞.
Also assume R
def
= γ + ν + δ > 0.
Lemma 6. (i) Ki(t) =
∫ t
−∞
eδ
i(s−t)I i(s)ds, where the L1-norms of
all feasible integrands are bounded by a constant times e(γ+ν)t;
in particular, the integral is a Lebesgue integral.
(ii) Let it = e
−(γ+ν)tIt, kt = e
−(γ+ν)tKt. There exists K¯ s.t. along
any feasible path,
∫ b
a
‖it‖dt ≤ K¯(b− a + 1) for any pair a ≤ b,
and (hence) ‖kt‖ ≤ K¯.
Remark 3. As explained and addressed in appendix C, the initial con-
dition is a bit too stringent conceptually, requiring exponential con-
vergence to 0 instead of just plain convergence. This is not crucial in
this paper: land and natural resources being anyway ruled out by the
need for balanced growth, it is natural to expect all δi > 0, so just Kt
bounded at −∞ already ensures exponential convergence to 0.
3.2. Time-invariant solution concepts. Solution concepts map an
economy and policy pair to an allocation. To induce a valuation they
have to be single-valued and satisfy time-invariance, in which case they
are called outcome functions (def. 8).
3.2.1. Isomorphism between Arrow-Debreu economies. To motivate the
definitions below, define isomorphism between two Arrow-Debreu eco-
nomies with finitely many goods and individuals. They are isomorphic
if there is a linear map ζ from the commodity space of one economy to
that of the other and there are one-to-one mappings from the sets of
individuals and of firms of one to those of the other such that:
23Non-null initial values can occur only for capital goods with δi = 0,
corresponding to land and resources.
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(i) the consumption set, preferences, and endowment of any agent
in the first economy are mapped by ξ to those of the corre-
sponding agent in the second economy;
(ii) the production set of each firm in one economy is mapped by
ξ to that of the corresponding firm in the second;
(iii) shareholdings are preserved.
When consumption sets are the non-negative orthant, ξ must map the
commodities’ names in the first economy one-to-one to those in the
second, together with appropriate re-scalings (changes of unit).
Another aspect of isomorphism, which is more familiar with a con-
tinuum of agents, is to multiply the population measure by a positive
constant C. Shareholdings refer then for each firm to a probability
distribution over the agents; and the one-to-one mapping of agents has
to be understood to be measurable as well as its inverse, and such that
the induced map on measures maps the first population measure to 1
C
times the second. Further, the firms’ production sets, as well as points
therein, are multiplied by C (in addition to the above re-scalings).
When production has constant returns to scale, as here (capital-
accumulation equations are linear, and the instantaneous production
sets, cones), shareholdings become irrelevant (profits being zero), and
multiplication by C maps the production set onto itself.
The isomorphism is equivalently described by a single linear bijec-
tion (with the required structure) between allocation spaces (product
of all consumption sets and production sets) of both economies. For
the isomorphism property, suffices then that it maps allocations to and
onto allocations, endowments to endowments, preserves preferences,
and that population measures are mapped to each other by the induced
map of agents and the multiplication by C, obtaining C from how the
map behaves on production sets as compared to consumption sets.
We will use this below with a new twist, in that indeed the mass of
each agent is multiplied by C, but with as final effect to preserve the
population measure, it being σ-finite.
3.2.2. Time-invariance in the og model. Consider next particular case
of such isomorphisms: it maps an agent of type τ born at time t to an
agent of the same type born at t+ h, multiplying his mass by eνh, and
maps any good dated t to the same good dated t+h, multiplying non-
labour quantities by eγh, and labour quantities by 1. Individual time
is not a good (not marketed), so the map of sect. 3.2.1 is applied using
the equivalent vector of effective time. The map of allocations is thus:
Definition 7. The transformation Th
(i) applies Sh to allocations;
(ii) multiplies individual consumption bundles by eγh;
(iii) multiplies production plans — aggregate effective labour, cap-
ital, investment, and consumption— by e(γ+ν)h.
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Remark 4. Equivalently, Th shifts the origin of time back by h, mul-
tiplies population measure and thus all aggregates by eνh, and divides
units of all non-labour goods by eγh.
Proposition 1. Th is an automorphism of the economy.
Next, Th mapping the economy to itself h time-units later, and poli-
cies being unit-free, the corresponding operation on policies is a pure
time-shift, without rescaling. So Th transforms (automorphism-invari-
ant) solutions of π to those of Shπ. We also impose single-valuedness:
Definition 8. An outcome function ς is a map from policies to indi-
vidual allocations, that is invariant under all Th: Th ◦ ς = ς ◦ Sh.
Remark 5. Many dynamic models have some form of stationary struc-
ture, hence natural solution concepts exhibit the same. This can be
exploited for local comparative statics; for instance, if one looks at
perturbations around a balanced growth equilibrium, and if there is a
selection by local uniqueness in its neighbourhood, then this selection
should satisfy the same invariance: indeed, time-shifts map the bal-
anced growth path to itself, so neighbouring paths are mapped in its
neighbourhood, hence, by local uniqueness, the selection is mapped to
itself.24 Such a selection gives (locally) a map from policies to outcomes,
that is the basis for comparative statics. In this paper we abstract away
the exact nature of such an outcome map, and retain only its time-
invariant structure — in order to be able to blackbox the policy space.
3.2.3. Examples of outcome functions. The first example is the max-
imisation of a time-invariant social welfare function, say, a utilitarian
one, provided the maximum is unique.
Other examples are equilibrium-based. An outcome function should
map a policy perturbation π to a locally unique equilibrium close to
that stemming from the status-quo policy π¯.
One way to model policy surprises is to assume the contracts signed
(‘at the beginning of time‘) in anticipation of the status-quo policy can
not be changed, so in the wake of an unexpected policy change, indi-
viduals sign additional contracts taking their status-quo consumption
as new endowment. The initial equilibrium being a balanced growth
equilibrium, the economy with that endowment also satisfies time-
invariance, and the resulting map from policies is again an outcome
function if the final allocation is locally unique. At least when policies
are lump sum taxes and benefits (endowment perturbations), this case
is particularly simple, as net individual demand under the base-line
24Clearly this also needs some form of stability, else as the amount of shifting
grows, the corresponding equilibria might slowly get out of the specified neighbour-
hood. However, as shown below there are other reasons why much more stringent
stability properties are needed anyway.
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prices is zero, so income effects disappear and the variation in individ-
ual utility depends just on the value of the endowment perturbation.
3.2.4. The case of indeterminacy. Even if dealing with a situation
that does not guarantee local uniqueness, one can choose the closest
prices to those in the initial equilibrium in terms of the L∞ norm:
25∑
i‖ln pi(t) − ln p¯i(t)‖∞, where p¯(t) is the price vector at the initial
equilibrium and p(t) at a perturbed economy. Though the price system
does not necessarily specify an equilibrium, it does specify the individ-
ual utility levels, which is sufficient for welfare analysis. The logarithms
make the distance independent of price normalisation, hence induce a
distance between price-rays: for any multiple of p¯i, the minimum, over
all multiples of pi, will be achieved at the corresponding multiple, and
the value of the minimum is independent of this multiple, and remains
the same when permuting the roles of p¯i and pi. Finally, the L∞ norm
being shift-invariant, the selection will be time-invariant. If the set of
minimisers is not a singleton, their correspondence can be expected to
be sufficiently thin that hopefully any outcome function obtained as
an invariant selection (axiom of choice) generically satisfies the differ-
entiability requirement — e.g., as in Mertens and Rubinchik (2008),
discussed in sect. 7. Finally, since thm. 2 already allows for a corre-
spondence, one could similarly extend def. 8, to obviate the need to
appeal to the axiom of choice in such cases.
But this is only one example of how to possibly construct outcome
functions in case of indeterminacy (which we do not expect to occur in
the model of sect. 3.1); one expects a continuum of such outcome func-
tions then. Since our results below hold for any of them, conceivably
with a linear functional q depending on the chosen outcome function,
the discount rate is established even then.
3.2.5. Balanced growth.
Definition 9. A balanced growth path is a T-invariant allocation.
On a balanced growth path individual labour is independent of the
birth-date, individual consumption grows at rate γ, and all aggregate
inputs and outputs at rate γ + ν, as in the standard (1 type, 1 good)
case (e.g., Arrow and Kurz, 1970; King, Plosser, and Rebelo, 2002).
The following sharpens the interpretation of basic policies, see cor. 1:
Lemma 7. The outcome of a constant policy is a balanced growth path.
Proof. By def. 8, it is mapped to itself by any Th. 
25Or equivalent ones, e.g., the L∞-norm of the ℓ2-norm over i of the ln differences.
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4. The discount rate
The discount rate for cost-benefit analysis depends on the social
welfare function. We consider both relative and classical utilitarianism.
Let v = U ◦ ς the profile of utility functions on P induced by the
profile of utility functions U and the outcome function ς.
4.1. The classical utilitarian approach. In sect. 4.1 we assume:
Assumption 3. ∀τ, ∀q ∈E⋆, f 7→
∫
e((1−ρ
τ)γ+ν−β)t〈q, f(t)〉dt belongs to F ⋆.
4.1.1. Evaluating policies.
Proposition 2. Assume all types have the same parameter ρ. Then v
is a valuation with parameter ̺ = (1− ρ)γ.
Proof. Let (c, l)
def
= ς(π). By the time-invariance of ς, ς(Shπ) = Th(c, l) =
(eγhSh(c), Sh(l)). So, by homogeneity of U , v◦Sh = e
(1−ρ)γh
Sh(v). Thus
v is a valuation with ah = 0 and bh = e
(1−ρ)γh. 
Prop. 2 and thm. 2 imply now:
Corollary 2. Assume all types have the same parameter ρ. If W =
S(v) is G-differentiable on P at π¯, then its differential equals, for some
q ∈ E⋆,
∫
e(ν−β+(1−ρ)γ)t〈q, δπ(t)〉dt.
In a society with type-dependent ρ, classical utilitarianism leads to
questionable implications; besides, it invalidates discounting:
Corollary 3. The welfare differential is∑
τ
∫ ∞
−∞
e(ν−β+(1−ρ
τ)γ)t〈qτ , δπ(t)〉dt =
∫ ∞
−∞
e(ν−β+γ)t
〈∑
τ
e−ρ
τγtqτ , δπ(t)
〉
dt
and hence the weight in the welfare function of the types with the
smallest ρ approaches one as time goes to +∞.
There are other ways to express the same idea; e.g., that along any
balanced growth path, in an optimal redistribution of consumption
goods (keeping the rest fixed) the fraction allocated to the agents with
the smallest ρ converges to 1.
4.1.2. The discount rate for cost-benefit analysis. In cost-benefit anal-
ysis, the effects of a variation in public policy are traditionally first
‘monetised’, i.e., expressed as an equivalent perturbation of individual
endowments of consumption goods, here initially 0.
Let thus E be the Banach space M of measures26 on age-groups and
types — i.e., on ∪τ ({τ} × [0, Tτ ]) — with values in R
n (space of con-
sumption bundles), with π¯ = 0 as status-quo, where b ∈ B determines
the endowment perturbation ω(t) = e(ν+γ)tb. Equivalently, express ba-
sic policies unit-free as fractions of status-quo aggregate consumption.
26Or L1, or the measures with continuous densities.
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Policies are thus endowment perturbations, representing arbitrary
flows of lump-sum real taxes and benefits. Then we get β + ργ as
discount rate, confirming our rough calculation in sect. 1.3:
Corollary 4. Assume all types have the same parameter ρ. If W =
S(v) is G-differentiable on P at 0, then its differential equals, for some
q ∈ M⋆,
∫
e−(β+ργ)t〈q, ω(t)〉dt.
Proof. By construction, π¯ = 0, so δπ = π and π(t) = e−(ν+γ)tω(t). 
Remark 6. Clearly, choosing a different growth rate in the definition of
ω would lead to the same corollary with a different discount rate. That
statement would however be empty, since there can be no outcome
function: B being a neighbourhood of 0, choose a negative measure b
s.t. ∀s ∈ [0, 1], sb ∈ B, and let ψ = bφ for some φ ∈ K with values in
[0, 1]. Then ψ is a policy, yet when it is shifted sufficiently to ±∞, the
feasible set under that policy becomes empty, by lemma 6.
4.2. The Relative Utilitarian approach. In sect. 4.2 we assume:
Assumption 4. ∀q ∈ E⋆, f 7→
∫
e(ν−β)t〈q, f(t)〉dt belongs to F ⋆.
As an alternative, we suggest to apply relative utilitarianism (ru),27
the social welfare functional where individual vnm utilities are nor-
malised between zero and one, and then summed. It is stressed in
Dhillon and Mertens (1999) that the ru-normalisation of individual
utilities has to be done on some universal set A of acceptable alterna-
tives, not specific to the problem under consideration, and representing
the constraints both of feasibility and of justice.
Assumption 5. The set A of acceptable policies is shift-invariant and
each individual utility is bounded on A.
The boundedness is a minimal implication of justice; as to the shift-
invariance, it is clearly a property of feasibility, but in relation to justice
it has a strong meaning, that physical units (like calories per day) are
irrelevant. And without it ru might lead to quite different conclusions.
But it is straight in the spirit of exogenous growth models — that (ac-
ceptable) policies affect only the height of the growth path, not the
growth rate; and it is arguably justified in a world described by such a
model: e.g., if calories per-day matter, utilities can’t be homogeneous.
Assume thus vnm utility functions, and that ς is defined on A— and
hence v too, by the definitions at the beginning of this section. Let MA
denote the ru-normalisation, i.e., the operation on a profile such that
each individual utility is normalised as to have range of size 1 on A.
Definition 10. The relative utilitarian swf is W = S(MA(v)).
27The axiomatisation (Dhillon and Mertens, 1999) is for a finite set of agents.
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ru’s anonymity axiom implies β = 0 in the specification of S, def. 5.
However, to allow for a richer model incorporating a probability of the
world ending tomorrow, β is not restricted.
4.2.1. Evaluating policies. In a growing economy the ru-normalisation
yields shift-invariance, hence strict valuations:
Proposition 3. MA(v) is a strict valuation.
Corollary 5. The ru-normalised utility of an agent of type τ on a
balanced growth path is independent of his birth-date.
Proof. Apply prop. 3 to the case where the basic policy space is a sin-
gleton, that doesn’t do anything, and where the outcome function maps
to the chosen balanced growth path. 
Corollary 6. If W = S(MA(v)) is G-differentiable on P at π¯, then its
differential equals
∫
e(ν−β)t〈q, δπ(t)〉dt for some q ∈ E⋆.
Proof. Prop. 3 and thm. 2. 
4.2.2. The discount rate for cost-benefit analysis. As in sect. 4.1.2, one
gets now, using cor. 6, the discount rate β + γ implied by relative util-
itarianism, well-defined even for a population with variable ρτ :
Corollary 7. If W = S(MA(v)) is G-differentiable on P at 0, then its
differential equals
∫
e−(β+γ)t〈q, ω(t)〉dt for some q ∈M⋆.
Restricting basic policies b to have all the same distribution over
age-groups and types, and setting β = 0, yields then the main result
in Mertens and Rubinchik (2006).
The derived discount rate, γ, differs generically from the interest
rate, even at the golden rule equilibrium if ν is non-zero.
5. A value of life argument
One touch-stone is the case β = 0, no discounting of utilities. Do
the prescriptions of the theory then indeed correspond to the intuitive
meaning of treating individuals of different generations equally?
A compelling implication of equal treatment is to give equal weight
to individual lives (cf. fn. 2), so, in cost-benefit analysis, to their mon-
etised values, i.e., the change in real consumption which is equivalent
for the individual to an extension of his life.
The monetised value of life, according to any criteria [e.g., each of
the four in Mishan’s (1971) introduction, or even judicial criteria in as-
sessing damages], is proportional to the individual’s life-time income.28
This is also formally true in the above economic model, when allow-
ing for a variable life-span: individual life-time utility is homogeneous,
so willingness to pay to extend life is proportional to life-time income.
28Even a claim that from the point of view of society, it would be proportional
to average life-time income at his time would leave our argument below intact.
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Theorem 3. In the model of sect. 3, extended by variable life-times, γ
is the only discount rate assuring equal monetary value of human lives.
Proof. Let the life-time utility, U τ, be defined on consumption and
labour streams of variable length, ∪T (R
n+m)[0,T ]. Consider, for an agent
of type τ , an optimal life-time consumption stream c of length T1 (in-
cluding the labour coordinates, taken say as negative), and let c′ be the
restriction of c to [0, T0], with T0 < T1. Let c˜ be expenditure-minimising
on [0, T1] s.t. U
τ(c˜) = U τ (c′). Then 〈p, c− c˜〉 is the monetary equivalent
of the utility loss he suffers from (unanticipated) premature death. Fur-
ther he leaves a debt (positive or negative) of 〈p, c′〉; so, since 〈p, c〉 = 0,
the net monetary equivalent of his loss equals 〈p, c′〉 − 〈p, c˜〉.
By homogeneity, and since in a bge relative prices are constant un-
der time-shift, when time is shifted by h and c is multiplied by eγh, c′
and c˜ get multiplied by the same factor. Thus, the willingness to pay to
avoid premature death is proportional to eγx. The above computation
could obviously have been done in several different ways (e.g., for the
case of anticipated death, let c′ be an optimal plan for a life-length of
T0), but all of them would lead to the same conclusion.
So, to treat individuals of all generations equally, future incomes
must be discounted exactly at rate γ, as implied by ru (cor. 7). 
This shows the conclusions of relative utilitarianism and of assump-
tion 5 are correct in a world as described by this model.
But maybe the conclusions depend crucially on the special features of
the model itself — exogenous growth, homogeneity, balanced growth?
In such a world, discounting may no longer be valid as an exact deriv-
ative of social welfare, but insofar as it is nevertheless used (possibly
viewed as a first approximation), one would still want human lives to be
treated approximately equally. If then “value of life” does not decrease29
exponentially fast to 0 as a proportion of life-time income, the growth
rate of per-capita consumption is still the only discount rate treating
human lives approximately equally: for any lower (resp. higher) rate,
values of future lives would become exponentially higher (resp. lower)
than those of present human beings.
The above argument is valid even with variable or stochastic growth;
it does however refer to “average human life” at any given time.30 Else
further qualifications would be needed in case income distribution be-
comes more and more disperse. Thus we have the following theorem:
29Spending for life extension cannot be invoked as a measure of its value, since
it might very well increase with the probability of success of treatments. But since
this probability is bounded above, it can be invoked for the asymptotic behaviour.
30As opposed to the “social value of a specific individual’s life” at that time,
which presumably depends also on what this individual would contribute to society
in the remaining part of his life.
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Theorem 4. In a world where the ratio of value of life to life-time in-
come does not go exponentially fast to 0, the growth rate of per-capita
consumption is the only discount rate s.t. average monetised values of
human lives at different periods have approximate equal present values.
6. The choice of social welfare function
Since classical and relative utilitarianism have so different implica-
tions for discounting, we discuss some of the underlying principles of
equitable treatment of different generations that each incorporates.
Interestingly, the implication of relative utilitarianism is consistent
with accepted public policy: the rate based on the relative utilitar-
ian criterion, γ ≈ 2%, falls exactly in the range, “between 1 and 3%”
(cf. sect. 1.1) mandated by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget.
Remarkably, relative utilitarianism is also consistent with the “bal-
anced generational policy” as presented in Kotlikoff (2002, p. 1905),
requiring “. . . that the generational accounts [lifetime net tax burdens]
of all future generations are equal, except for a growth adjustment.”
The discount rate β + ργ based on classical utilitarianism (cor. 4) is
well-known in the applied literature. Even if individual risk attitudes
were identical (far from the empirical findings, see Einav and Cohen
(2007)), based on reported estimates (Drèze, 1981; Einav and Cohen,
2007), the implied discount rate would be far above the range suggested
by the omb. To get acceptable conclusions one has to set ρ close to
unity (e.g., Stern, 2007, pp. 6–11). Then the choice of a discount rate
involves imposing individual risk preferences, contradicting any util-
itarian foundation since only the indifference map is retained as in-
dividual characteristic. But, neglecting society’s rationality over risky
prospects, it is consistent with a welfarist approach, ρ being viewed as a
parameter of aggregation rather than an individual characteristic. Note
that imposing ρ = 1 means forcing the discount rate implied by ru.
The main reason ρ enters the calculation of the discount rate under
classical utilitarianism is the presumption that the marginal utility of
income is independent of the environment surrounding the individual.
In particular, a 1% increase in real income of any of our contemporaries
has the same effect as it would 100 years ago for the same individual
with the same real income.
In contrast, relative utilitarianism, in the context of a growing eco-
nomy, implies that to compare individual utility differences, the utilities
have first to be normalised over the space of feasible policies (consump-
tion paths). As a consequence, even in the presence of economic growth,
the social value of a 1% increase in real income of an individual at a
given quantile of the income distribution is independent of the date.
Forcing logarithmic utilities, as in Stern (2006), amounts to choose the
best possible approximation to this under traditional welfarism.
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7. Concluding remarks
7.1. The static component of the derivative. The problem of eval-
uating policy changes, i.e., finding the derivative of social welfare with
respect to policy variations, is thus reduced to the static one of com-
puting the linear functional q on the space of basic policies B. If for
example B is finite-dimensional, q can be computed by a finite number
of evaluations (direct computations) of the derivative in the direction
of each of the b ∈ B constituting a basis of B. Arguably, the effect of
a perturbation in the direction of a constant policy should be easier to
compute, especially in view of the main result assuring the derivative
should be of the form q(b)
∫
eζtφ(t)dt, where φ ∈ K describes the inten-
sity of the perturbation away from the status-quo in the direction of b.31
7.2. The differentiability assumption. Applicability of the results
hinges on the existence of differentiable outcome functions, as illus-
trated by rem. 6. For the case of endowment perturbations (cor. 4 and
7), this would be a straight extension of Debreu’s 1976 classical generic
regularity theorem. There are, however, several aspects that make such
an extension highly non-trivial. First, it is well-known that overlapping
generations models can give rise to indeterminacy, see e.g., Kehoe and
Levine (1984), Geanakoplos and Brown (1985). Next, even if regularity
is assured, already for the welfare function to be well-defined, the equi-
librium has to be stable: the perturbed equilibrium has to converge suf-
ficiently fast back to the unperturbed solution, both at +∞ and at−∞.
This program was successfully completed for a particular case in
Mertens and Rubinchik (2008), ensuring thus at least non-vacuity of
our results. It seems a crucial aspect there too is to start time at −∞.
7.3. Permanent changes. For evaluating permanent policy changes,
one should re-interpret welfare functions in this paper as normalised,
e.g. in per-capita terms, like limT→∞
1
NT
∫ T
−T
eνx
∑
τ N
τ
0U
τ
xdx (where
NT = 2 sinh(νT )/ν). Welfare per-capita is our preferred interpreta-
tion of a social welfare function, as would have been Harsanyi’s, if we
are reading him correctly, e.g. when thinking of it as the expected util-
ity of an un-identified individual. Welfare viewed as a sum, as in this
paper, is then only an additional higher order term (of order 1
NT
) in the
expansion of the above (w.r.t. NT ), to fine-tune transitions. In fact, our
restriction to temporary policy deviations was just to make sure the
other terms vanish. But this whole area remains to be explored; we offer
even no idea about what might be the form of an asymptotic expansion.
Observe that under ru, for constant policies π, U τx (π) is independent
of x (cor. 1 and prop. 3), so the above average gives trivially the swf
over constant policies (asymptotically constant probably too, generi-
cally, but proof is certainly non-obvious). But a conjecture that this
31Mertens and Rubinchik (2008) contains an example of such a computation.
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U τ might yield q, for example as derivative, is unlikely to work: note it
is independent of β, while q should in general depend on β: e.g., policies
favouring the old will come out better with high discounting, since the
old were born earlier. This is why an approach like in Mertens and Ru-
binchik (2008) seems more promising to get analytically a handle on q.
Appendix A. An equation with shift operators
Lemma 8. Let E be a set, with maps Sh : E → E s.t. Sh1 ◦ Sh2 = Sh1+h2 .
Let also V be the space of functions of time with values in R
n
. Assume
ϕ : E → V is s.t. ∀h ∃ah ∈ R
n, bh ∈ R++, both Lebesgue-measurable in h:
ϕ ◦ Sh = ah + bhSh ◦ ϕ
Then ∃ζ ∈ R and A ∈ Rn such that ∀h, one can take bh = e
ζh, ah =
Ae
ζh−1
eζ−1
, the fraction being defined by continuity if ζ = 0.
ζ is not unique iff ∃α ∈ Rn : ϕie(t) ∈ R ⇒ ϕ
i
e(t) = α
i, the superscript
denoting the coordinate. When ζ is unique, Ai is unique iff ∃e, t : ϕie(t) ∈ R.
Proof. Let h = h1 + h2. Then ϕ ◦ Sh = ah2 + bh2[Sh2 ◦ (ah1 + bh1Sh1 ◦ ϕ)].
So ah + bhSh ◦ ϕ = ah2 + bh2ah1 + bh2bh1Sh ◦ ϕ.
If, for some pair h1, h2, bh 6= bh1bh2 , then whenever (Sh ◦ ϕ)
i
e(t) ∈ R, the
above equation determines its value, say αi. The same obviously holds then
for ϕ itself. For such a ϕ, one can set ah = 0, bh = 1 ∀h; thus we can
always assume bh1+h2 = bh1bh2 . Since bh > 0, taking logarithms reduces it
to f(x+ y) = f(x)+ f(y), of which it is well-known that any Lebesgue-mea-
surable solution is linear (Fréchet, 1913). Thus bh = e
ζh.
As to ah, for each i, if ∃e, t : (Sh◦ϕ)
i
e(t) ∈ R, then our above equation sim-
plifies, after substituting the b’s, to aih1+h2 = a
i
h2
+ aih1e
ζh2 , and else one can
set aih = 0 ∀h, so again we can assume the above equation holds always. The
same argument as above implies then the result in the case ζ = 0. And for
ζ 6= 0, we get ah2+ah1e
ζh2 = ah1+ah2e
ζh1 , i.e., ah1(e
ζh2−1) = ah2(e
ζh1−1).
This implies first a0 = 0, hence the result for h = 0, and next that, for all
h1, h2 different from 0,
ahi
eζhi−1
is independent of i, so ah
eζh−1
is constant over
all h 6= 0. Since ζ 6= 0, we can write this constant as A
eζ−1
, thus finishing the
proof, the uniqueness part being elementary. 
Appendix B. Proofs
Proof of remark 1. Obviously, for ϕ ∈ KE , f ◦ ϕ ∈ KR. Conversely, since
f ◦ ϕ is C∞ for all f ∈ E∗, ϕ is C∞ with values in E (e.g., Edwards,
1965, Ex. 8.14 p. 609). Since further each f ◦ ϕ has compact support, it is
elementary that ϕ has compact support. 
Proof of thm. 1. If ζ is not uniquely determined, lemma 1 implies W is, on
every straight line through π¯, constant in a neighbourhood of π¯. Letting
thus q = 0 makes the result true for any ζ.
Else there exists, by definition of a Gateaux-differential, µ ∈ K∗E s.t.
(1) DWπ¯(δπ) = lim
ε→0
W (π¯ + εδπ) −W (π¯)
ε
= 〈µ, δπ〉
DISCOUNT RATE FOR COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 25
Start with the particular case E = R and F = K, using K for KR.
By lemma 1, W ◦Sh = e
ζhW +Ae
ζh−1
eζ−1
, hence by constancy of π¯ (Sπ¯ = π¯),
and (1),
〈µ,Sh(δπ)〉 = e
ζh〈µ, δπ〉
Since B is a neighbourhood of π¯, every ϕ ∈ K is a multiple of some δπ,
hence the following holds for all h ∈ R and all ϕ ∈ K:
〈µ,ϕ− e−ζhShϕ〉 = 0
Dividing by h and taking the limit (in K !) as h→ 0 yields
〈µ,ϕ′ + ζϕ〉 = 0
The definition of the derivative of a generalised function, µ ∈ K∗,〈
µ′, ϕ
〉
= −
〈
µ,ϕ′
〉
, ∀ϕ ∈ K
yields then
〈ζµ− µ′, ϕ〉 = 0, ∀ϕ ∈ K
By Gel’fand and Shilov (1959, p. 53) the equation ζµ− µ′ = 0 has µ = qeζt
for some q ∈ R as only solutions in K∗, so,
(2) DWπ¯(δπ) = 〈qe
ζt, δπ〉 = q
∫
eζtδπtdt, ∀δπ ∈ K
Next step is to extend the result to any Banach space E and F = KE .
Lemma 9. Any function ϕ ∈ KE can be approximated in KE by functions
with finite-dimensional range.
Proof. Let Dn = {ϕ
(i)
( j
n!
)
| 0 ≤ i ≤ n, j ∈ Z}. Dn is an increasing se-
quence of finite subsets of E. Let Fn be the subspace spanned by Dn and
pn a projector from E to Fn (i.e., pn : E → Fn is the identity on Fn).
Its existence follows from Hahn-Banach, Fn being finite-dimensional. Then
ϕn = pn ◦ ϕ ∈ KFn and converges in KE to ϕ. 
Consider policy variations δπ ∈ KE of the form bφ : t 7→ bφ(t) with b ∈ E
and φ ∈ K. By (1) and (2), ∀b ∈ E ∃qb ∈ R s.t. 〈µ, bφ〉 = qb
∫
φ(t)eζtdt
∀φ ∈ K. So, for Iφ =
∫
φ(t)eζtdt 6= 0, the map b 7→ qb =
〈µ,bφ〉
Iφ
is in E∗, i.e.,
qb = 〈q, b〉 with q ∈ E
∗.
So, for any ϕ of the form bφ,
(1) 〈µ,ϕ〉 =
∫
〈q, ϕ(t)〉eζtdt
Since any ϕ ∈ KE with finite-dimensional range is a sum of policy vari-
ations of the form bφ, (1) remains true by linearity for them. They being
dense in KE by lemma 9, (1) extends by continuity to KE .
Finally we extend the result to arbitrary F .
SinceKE embeds continuously in F , P
KE ⊆ PF and Gateaux-differentiab-
ility on PF implies that on PKE . Thus the assumptions of the theorem hold
on KE too. So the differential is a continuous linear functional on F , given
on KE by the formula
∫
〈q, ϕ(t)〉eζtdt. This being by assumption continuous
on F , the differential on F must coincide with it, KE being dense in F . 
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Proof of lemma 4. Since Shπ¯ = π¯, W (Shπ) = Vc,r(v(Shπ) − v(Shπ¯)); by
def. 3, lemma 2, homogeneity of Vc,r, def. 4 and lemma 3 resp.,
W (Sh(π)) = Vc,r(e
̺h
Sh(v(π) − v(π¯))) = e
̺hrVc,r(Sh(v(π)− v(π¯)))
= ahe
̺hr + e(̺r+c)hVc,r(v(π)−v(π¯)) = a
′
h + e
(̺r+c)hW (π) 
Proof of lemma 6. Since the closed convex cone Y is pointed (irreversibility),
there exists a linear functional α whose unique maximiser on Y is 0. Then
〈α, y〉 ≤ −ε‖y‖ on Y , i.e., by rescaling α, 〈α, y〉 ≤ −‖y‖. Observe too that
free disposal implies α >> 0. Write α as (αL, αK , αI , αC).
First step is to establish the bound on K sub (ii).
Fix a vector L¯ ∈ Rh s.t. any feasible vector of labour inputs Lt ≤ L¯e
(γ+ν)t
(i.e., to compute a given coordinate of L¯, assume all agents spend 100% of
their time on that activity).
Allow perfect substitution at rates αI between all investment goods and
between all capital goods: let F : R2+ → R+ : (κ¯, λ) 7→ sup{〈α
I , I〉 | ∃K ≥
0, 〈αI ,K〉 ≤ κ¯, (−λL¯,−K, I, 0) ∈ Y }.
The sup is finite, since 〈αI , I〉 ≤ 〈αK ,K〉 + λ〈αL, L¯〉 and 〈αK ,K〉 is
bounded on the compact set K ≥ 0, 〈αI ,K〉 ≤ κ¯ (recall α >> 0). Further
the sup is achieved, the sets {y ∈ Y | 〈α, y〉 ≥ −M} being compact (since
then ‖y‖ ≤M), so that the sup is effectively over a compact set. Clearly F
is positively homogeneous of degree 1 and concave, and is continuous again
because locally everything happens within a compact subset of Y .
Thus by homogeneity F (κ¯, λ) = λϕ( κ¯λ ), where ϕ(x) = F (x, 1) is concave,
≥ 0 and continuous. Further by the “no-rabbit” assumption, F (κ¯, 0) = 0, so,
by continuity of F , ϕ(x)x → 0 at ∞.
For any feasible path (Lt,Kt, It, Ct), let ι˜t = 〈α
I , It〉 and κ˜t = 〈α
I ,Kt〉.
Then, since δ ≤ δi and K ≥ 0, the capital-accumulation equation im-
plies κ˜′t ≤ ι˜t − δκ˜t; further Lt ≤ L¯e
(γ+ν)t implies (free-disposal) ι˜t ≤
e(γ+ν)tϕ(e−(γ+ν)tκ˜t). So with (lt, κt, ιt, ct) = e
−(γ+ν)t(Lt, κ˜t, ι˜t, Ct) :
κ′t ≤ ϕ(κt)−Rκt
To bound ‖kt‖, it suffices to prove from this that κt is bounded by some
constant independent of the feasible path, since αI >> 0.
Also the initial condition yields that eRtκt converges exponentially fast
to 0 at −∞, i.e., since R > 0, there exists ε : 0 < ε < R such that, with
r = R− ε > 0, ertκt → 0 at −∞ along a subsequence. Since
ϕ(x)
x → 0 at ∞,
there exists A s.t., ∀x, ϕ(x) ≤ A+ εx; so κ′t ≤ A− rκt.
Next step is to prove from this that κt ≤ K¯, with K¯ =
A
r .
Else κt0 > K¯ for some t0; since κ
′
t < 0 for κt > K¯, this implies that
κt > K¯ and is decreasing for t ≤ t0. Define y by y
′
t = A− ryt with the pre-
scribed terminal value κt0 at t0. The relations for κ and y are equivalent to
r d
dert (e
rtκt) ≤ A and
r d
dert (e
rtyt) = A, so, since
dert
rdt > 0,
d
dt(e
rtκt) ≤
d
dt(e
rtyt):
for t ≤ t0, κt ≥ yt =
A
r + (κt0 −
A
r )e
r(t0−t), contradicting that ertκt → 0 at
−∞ along a subsequence.
Hence the uniform bound on ‖kt‖ .
DISCOUNT RATE FOR COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 27
Next, 〈α, y〉 ≤ −‖y‖ yields
∫ b
a ‖it‖dt ≤
∫ b
a (〈α
L, lt〉 + 〈α
K , kt〉 − 〈α
I , it〉 −
〈αC , ct〉)dt. The last inner product is non-negative, and the capital-accumula-
tion equation yields k′t
j = ijt − R
jk
j
t with R
j = γ + ν + δj as before,
so that
∫ b
a 〈α
I , it〉dt =
∫ b
a 〈α
I , k′t〉dt +
∑
j α
I
jR
j
∫ b
a k
j
t dt = 〈α
I , kb − ka〉 +∑
j α
I
jR
j
∫ b
a k
j
t dt ≥ −〈α
I , ka〉, since R
j > 0. Thus our bounds on kt and
lt imply
∫ b
a ‖it‖dt ≤ K¯(b− a+ 1) for some constant K¯.
Thus point (ii). For (i), e−(γ+ν)t
∫ t
−∞ e
δj(s−t)|Ijs |ds =
∫∞
0 e
−Rjx|ijt−x|dx
≤
∑∞
n=0 e
−Rjn
∫ n+1
n |i
j
t−x|dx is uniformly bounded by (ii). For M
i
t = e
δitKit ,
the differential equations become M i ′t = h
i
t, with h
i
t
def
= eδ
itIit , hence, by
the integrability, M it = M
i
−∞ +
∫ t
−∞ h
i
sds. And the initial condition yields
limt→−∞M
i
t = 0, so M
i
−∞ = 0, hence (i). 
Proof of prop. 1. Comparing the rescaling of consumption goods in the con-
sumption sets (ii) and in the production set (iii) shows that the mass of any
agent is to be multiplied by C = eνh. For labour goods, this ratio is correct
too, given the labour saving technological growth included in aggregate ef-
fective labour. By (i), the “induced map of agents” maps an individual of
type τ born at time t to an individual of the same type born at t + h, so
the population of the new economy at time t is that of the old at time t− h
multiplied by eνh, hence equals that of the original economy at t: the pop-
ulation measure is preserved. Remains thus only to prove that preferences
are preserved and that allocations are mapped to allocations: the one-to-one
and onto aspect will then follow from the same property for the inverse T−h.
Consumption sets are unchanged: at any t non-negativity constraints are
preserved by the re-scalings (ii), besides, time fractions are not re-scaled,
so the constraint that their sum be ≤ 1 is preserved too. Preferences are
homogeneous in the consumption goods, so are preserved by re-scaling (ii).
As for production, capital accumulation equations are linear in capital and
investment, so are preserved given (iii), as well as the initial condition (also
in its weak form of prop. 4): both convergence to 0 and exponential con-
vergence to 0 are preserved under shifting and multiplication by a constant.
And Y is unchanged under the scaling by e(γ+ν)h (iii). 
Proof of cor. 3. Let Vc =
∑
τ V
τ
c , where V
τ0
c with c = ν − β is the utility
aggregator defined as
∫∞
−∞ e
−βt
∑
τ 1τ0N
τ
t (v
τ
t (π)− u¯
τ
t ) dt. Applying cor.2 to
each V τc , i.e., to the economy in which utilities of all types but τ are identi-
cally zero, one obtains the differential of W :
∑
τ
∫ ∞
−∞
e(ν−β+(1−ρ
τ)γ)t〈qτ , δπ(t)〉dt =
∫ ∞
−∞
e(ν−β+γ)t
〈∑
τ
e−ρ
τγtqτ , δπ(t)
〉
dt
Visibly the criterion qτ of the types with the smallest ρ asymptotically gets
all the weight. 
Proof of prop. 3. Shift invariance of A implies T-invariance of the set of
the induced (acceptable) allocations under an outcome function ς, thus if
ς(π) = (c, l) for some π ∈ A, then ∀h ς(Shπ) = (e
γh
Shc,Shl), and Shπ ∈ A.
So the utility difference between the worst and best acceptable allocations for
an agent of type τ is, by homogeneity of utilities, proportional to e(1−ρ
τ )γx:
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this is the normalisation factor. Thus, again by homogeneity, MA(v
τ
x(π)) =
wτU τ (e−γxcτx, l
τ
x). Hence, since ς ◦ Sh = Th ◦ ς and e
−γx
Thc
τ
x = Sh(e
−γxcτx),
one gets MA(v
τ
x(Shπ)) = w
τU τ (Sh(e
−γxcτx, l
τ
x)) = ShMA(v
τ
x(π)). 
Appendix C. Initial Conditions
Even with the weakest initial condition, say Kt bounded at −∞, one
should expect Kit to converge to 0 at −∞ if δ
i > 0. But land and natural
resources are the typical examples of goods with δi = 0, so the natural value
for δ in a general form of the initial condition and lemma 6 is 0.32 The ini-
tial condition is thus a bit too stringent conceptually, requiring exponential
convergence to the initial value 0 instead of just plain convergence. An addi-
tional reason to want just plain convergence there is that then the “initial con-
dition” becomes equivalent to the initial condition for the integral formula of
Kt in terms of It: even with δ
i = 0, Kit = K
i
−∞+
∫ t
−∞ e
δi(s−t)Ii(s)ds implies
Kit → K
i
−∞ at −∞.
33 We make a first attempt here to address this issue.
Lemma 10. (i) Every β >> 0 in Rm is the αI of some linear functional
α having a unique maximiser on Y .
(ii) For α >> 0, let ψα(x) = sup{〈α, I〉 | ∃K ≥ 0, ‖K‖ ≤ x,
(−(1, 1, 1, . . .),−K, I, 0) ∈ Y }. Then
∫∞
1
ψα(x)
x2
dx is finite iff the
same integral is finite replacing ψα(x) by ϕα(x)
def
= sup{〈α, I〉 |
∃K ≥ 0, 〈α,K〉 ≤ x, (−L¯,−K, I, 0) ∈ Y }.
Proof. For point (i), let E be the commodity space Rh × Rm × Rm × Rn,
containing Y , with vectors typically denoted (−L,−K, I,C). Let F be the
subspace where L = C = 0, and let β′ extend β with arbitrary positive
K-coordinates. Let G = {x ∈ F | 〈β′, x〉 = 0}. By the No-Rabbit assump-
tion, G ∩ Y = {0}. By irreversibility, there exists a linear functional γ on E
having a unique maximizer on Y ; so Y ′ = {y ∈ Y | 〈γ, y〉 ≤ −1} and G are
disjoint closed convex sets, with disjoint asymptotic cones: their difference
is a closed convex set disjoint from 0, hence they can be strictly separated:
there is a linear functional α with 〈α,G〉 > 〈α, Y ′〉. G being a subspace, this
implies α vanishes on G, and has 0 as unique maximiser on Y . Thus some
positive multiple of α coincides with β′ on F ; in particular, αI = β.
For point (ii), observe first that the integrability condition on ϕα(x) is
equivalent to that on ϕα(cx), for any c > 0. Now, K ≥ 0 and α >> 0 imply
that 〈α,K〉 is a norm, so for any norm there exist c > 0 and c¯ such that
c‖K‖ ≤ 〈α,K〉 ≤ c¯‖K‖. The independence from c of the condition on ϕα
allows then to replace that inner product by ‖K‖. Similarly, to replace L¯ by
a vector of 1’s, first majorise and minorise it by a multiple of this vector. 
32Conceptually our “Initial Condition” is best thought of as a pair: on the one
hand, a general form, say something like Kt bounded at −∞, provided one can
prove from this convergence at −∞, and on the other hand a specific assumption
to ensure balanced growth, i.e., that the limit is 0.
33Independently of the natural requirement that for natural resources (e.g., min-
ing —), Y should force Ii ≤ 0, and for land (raw acreage), Ii = 0.
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As the proof of lemma 6 shows, the “No-Rabbit” condition is equivalent
to ϕ(x)x → 0, so the condition
∫∞
1
ϕ(x)
x2
dx < ∞ appears as a very slight
strengthening. This justifies the following:
Definition 11. The “Strong No-Rabbit” condition on Y is that
∫∞
1
ψα(x)
x2
dx
<∞ for some α >> 0.
Proposition 4. The conclusions of lemma 6 remain true when weakening in
the Initial Condition the exponentially fast convergence to plain convergence,
provided the Strong No-Rabbit condition holds.
Proof. Fix α ∈ A according to the Strong No-Rabbit condition, and, us-
ing lemma 10.i to find a corresponding α in the proof of lemma 6, fol-
low that proof till where ϕ (= ̟α) is majorised by A + εx, and let now
f(x) = Rx− ϕ(x), K¯ = inf{k | f(k) > 0}, and fix a corresponding κt0 .
Then, prove first that, for t ≤ t0, κt ≥ yt, with yt the solution of y
′
t =
ϕ(yt)−Ryt with prescribed value at t0: reversing time, and translating t0 to 0,
we have, using xt for κt, x
′
t ≥ f(xt) a.e., y
′
t = f(yt) a.e., x0 = y0, f(x0) > 0,
f is increasing for x ≥ x0, and need to show xt ≥ yt for t > 0. Translating f
and the functions x, y, we can even assume x0 = y0 = 0, f(0) > 0, so f is pos-
itive and increasing on R+. SoH(x) =
∫ x
0
1
f(y)dy is well-defined, positive, C
1,
concave and increasing on R+. Assuming the chain-rule for differentiation
established for the composition H ◦ x of such an H with a Denjoy primitive
like xt, we obtain (H◦x)
′
t = H
′(xt)x
′
t =
x′t
F (xt)
≥ 1, and similarly (H◦y)′t = 1,
hence, for t ≥ 0, H(xt) ≥ H(yt) and so xt ≥ yt by strict monotonicity of H.
Thus indeed κt ≥ yt for t ≤ t0. Since further κt and yt are decreasing
and continuous on that range, they have continuous and decreasing inverse
functions tκ and ty defined on [κt0 ,∞[ and values in ]−∞, t0], and there
tκ ≥ ty. Now y′t = −f(yt) means
dy
f(y) = −dt, hence, since yt0 = κt0 ,
ty(x) = t0 −
∫ x
κt0
dz
f(z) . So t
κ(x) ≥ t0 −
∫ x
κt0
dz
f(z) .
But the “weak” initial condition is that eRtκ(t) −−−→
t→−∞
0, so, eRt
κ(x)x −−→x→∞
0, i.e., ln(x)+Rtκ(x) −−→x→∞ −∞, and thus, by our bound on t
κ,34 and replacing
ln by its integral definition, neglecting constants,
∫ x
a
dz
z −R
∫ x
a
dz
f(z) −−→x→∞ −∞,
with a = max{1, κt0}. Given the formula for f , this means
∫ x
a
ϕ(z)
z(Rz−ϕ(z)) →
∞, and hence, ϕ(z) being negligible compared to z, and R > 0, that∫ x
1
ϕ(z)
z2 →∞, contradicting the Strong No-Rabbit condition by lemma 10.ii.
Thus indeed κt ≤ K¯ ∀t. The rest of the proof of lemma 6 remains as is. 
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